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العنوان
Study of Some Factors on the Behavior of
Strategies on Some Models of Iterated Games /
المؤلف
Mahmoud, Mohamed Mamdouh Ahmed.
هيئة الاعداد
باحث / محمد ممدوح أحمد محمود
مشرف / عصام أحمد سليمان الصعيدي
مناقش / شكرى ابراهيم ندا
مناقش / السيد أحمد الشربيني
تاريخ النشر
2024.
عدد الصفحات
118 P. :
اللغة
الإنجليزية
الدرجة
الدكتوراه
التخصص
الإحصاء والاحتمالات
تاريخ الإجازة
1/1/2024
مكان الإجازة
جامعة عين شمس - كلية العلوم - قسم الرياضيات
الفهرس
Only 14 pages are availabe for public view

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from 118

Abstract

The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game has found widespread use in various domains, including economics, biology, military, and business. Most of the researchers generated the new state using the outcome of the immediately previous one (memory one) [1]. In this research, a novel procedure is put forth to increase the memory of the IPD. In this approach, the new round is formulated by employing the result of the unit before the last one rather than the immediately preceding one [2]. The new states are generated using strategies depicted by the two-state automata. Then, a 16×16 payoff matrix is computed and constructed. Mixed strategies among all heteroclinic three cycles are obtained using Axelrod’s payoff entries. Some of weak strategies appear for the first time to be strong strategies.
Most of the researchers didn’t care about the probability of repetition of any regime in one conflict. This probability of repetition may affect the average payoff. The effect of repetition is studied in this thesis. Payoff matrix entities have been calculated using Maple program. The defective strategies have good performance and crush cooperative ones when the probability of repetition is taken into account [3].
Then the strategies payoffs using the second previous state with different average relatedness between players is discussed. Using different relatedness in memory two, Pavlov’s strategy is not invaded by any other strategy in the strictly alternating prisoners’ dilemma game [4].
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first one contains the history and basic definitions of game theory that will be used. The second chapter discusses the basics of the Iterated Simultaneous Prisoners’ Dilemma Game. The third chapter introduces the memory change and regime repetition effect on simultaneous IPD. The fourth chapter illustrates the effect of memory increment in alternating IPD. The fifth one shows how relative players cooperate in alternating IPD.