الفهرس 
الفصل الاوليوجد فقط 14 صفحة متاحة للعرض العام
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المستخلص
Corruption is an important global social problem that exists in many forms.
The study found that forms of corruption such as bribery, extortion, fraud,
remittances, nepotism and embezzlement contribute to slowing economic growth and
development in developing countries. Corruption in public institutions is an important
global social problem that exists in many forms and is responsible for slow economic
growth and development in developing countries. Although the presence of
corruption in low-lying developing countries is evident, it was not clearly understood
prior to this study.
The main purpose of this quantitative study was, do countries with more fiscal
decentralized and spending powers, such as Uganda and South Africa, have a lower
level of corruption? Do changes in the degree of decentralization of these authorities
affect the level of corruption?
This study examines the impact of decentralization on financial corruption in
South Africa and Uganda. Most recent literature tends to suggest that decentralization
reduces corruption, an outcome often attributed to citizens’ ability to hold local
officials accountable through the democratic process. However, no studies focus on
this region in particular, which a gap is given the prevalence of new policies, weak
institutions, and a lack of democracy in many countries. Studies have indicated that
decentralization may reduce corruption - albeit slightly. Therefore, this study
examines the impact of fiscal decentralization in a country on the level of corruption.
It is theoretically clear that fiscal decentralization, similar to an increase in the
number of competing jurisdictions, leads to a lower level of corruption. This
hypothesis is then tested using datasets for the Republic of South Africa and the
Republic of Uganda. Driven by a theoretical model, this study explored the link
between financial decentralization and corruption. The empirical results are not very
strong, but suggest that a hypothetical relationship between decentralization and
corruption may indeed exist. It also provides misleading evidence that corruption
may actually be lower in countries where the scope of fiscal decentralization is high.
If confirmed, this result indicates that the benefits of decentralization outweigh the
well-known gains from a better match between public spending and consumer
preferences.
The study of the topic of the role of financial decentralization and its
relationship to corruption in the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of
Uganda relied on the descriptive approach, which is the basic method of the study. It
also relied on the analytical method, which is one of the most widely used methods in
the study of political activity. The system is the unit of analysis, and the study used it
ز
in multiple regression analysis to measure the impact of financial decentralization on
corruption rates.
The study concluded with several results and recommendations, the most prominent
of which is:
Our approach is novel and contrasts with previous work that emphasized the linear
positive/negative impact of decentralization on corruption. from an empirical point
of view, the dynamics of corruption and the panel dimension (which is almost
ignored in this field of analysis) must be exploited. Instead, we use the GMM
procedure to simultaneously consider the temporal aspect of corruption, interpersonal
variance and the emerging problem of homogeneity. Various empirical specifications
as well as strength checks confirmed that an ideal arrangement - to reduce corruption
- for achieving decentralization would require decentralized “intermediate”
arrangements.
In South Africa, Pearson’s correlations showed a linear relationship between
decentralization and levels of corruption. We found a negative relationship between
fiscal decentralization of government spending and corruption. In South Africa, the
combination of weak democracy at the local level and weak oversight led to
increased corruption with increased decentralization of government.
As for measuring corruption in Uganda, Pearson’s correlations showed an
inverse relationship between decentralization and lower levels of corruption (r =
0.46), with statistical significance at level (0.01). Uganda looks specifically at the
extent of local accountability and the ability of central governments to monitor the
Local Governance. In Uganda, local accountability was strong enough to lead to a
decrease in corruption with the decentralization of the country.
It is interesting to note that Uganda and South Africa implemented democratic
decentralization around the same time, in the late 1990s. But we find that
decentralization in Uganda, despite the lack of political will to fight corruption, and
despite inheritance policies, seems to have had an impact in reducing corruption. As
for South Africa, it is not a heritage country, and it can be argued that its leaders have
shown greater will than that of Uganda (although the trend is discouraging).
However, decentralization has not reduced corruption. Rather, it has helped
encourage the slow rise of patronage politics as evidenced by the new class of
”entrepreneurs,” a troubling development in a country that was previously mostly
devoid of this kind of system. Even in an environment that theory predicts will lead
to better governance, decentralization can lead to increased corruption, as
exemplified in the case of South Africa. Meanwhile, Uganda shows that even in a
country with extensive patronage networks and weak monitoring institutions,
decentralization can reduce levels of corruption