الفهرس 
ABSTRACTOnly 14 pages are availabe for public view
 |  | from | 120 |  |  |
| | | from | 120 | | |
Abstract
The rapid progress in wireless mobile communication technology and personal communication systems has prompted new security questions. Since open air is used as the communication’ channel, the content of the communication may be exposed to an eavesdropper, or system services can be used fraudulently. In order to have reliable proper security over the wireless communication channel, certain security measures, e.g., confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity need to be provided. In a wireless mobile communication system, users and network servers need to authenticate one another and agree on a session key to be used for encryption purposes in their conversation. An authenticated key agreement protocol (AKA) is a fundamental tool in cryptography with which it is possible for two or more parties to establish a shared session key, using public
channels.In this thesis, the problem of establishing a shared session key in an authenticated way is addressed. New key agreement protocols that support explicit authentication are proposed. The protocols are designed in such a way that permits a trusted third party, such as a firewall, to verify the identities of the parties involved in a key agreement session. This is of course to reduce the computational burden at the end-user side, which can be a device with limited capabilities. The security properties of the proposed protocols are analyzed revealing the strength of these protocols promoting their use in practical scenarios such as in mobile communications. The proposed protocols have been implemented using the PBC (pairing-Based cryptography) C++ library to validate their correctness and to demonstrate the ease of their implementation as well as their timeliness. The performance of the proposed protocols from the computational point of view as well as their security properties have been compared to others schemes in literature. Though a slight increase in the computational burden has been noticed, yet it is justified by the higher level of security offered by our protocols.